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Abstract—As more and more data is transmitted in the
configurable optical layer, – whereby all optical switches forward
packets without electronic layers involved, we envision privacy as
the intrinsic property of future optical networks. In this paper, we
propose Optical Onion Routing (OOR) routing and forwarding
techniques, inspired by the onion routing in the Internet layer, -
the best known realization of anonymous communication today,
– but designed with specific features innate to optical networks.
We propose to design the optical anonymization network system
with a new optical anonymization node architecture, including
the optical components and their electronic counterparts to
realize layered encryption. We propose modification to the secret
key generation using Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), –
able to utilize different primitive irreducible polynomials, and
the usage optical XOR operation as encryption, an important
optical technology coming of age. We prove formally that, for
the proposed encryption techniques and distribution of secret
information, the optical onion network is perfectly private and
secure. The paper aims at providing practical foundations for
privacy-enhancing optical network technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication privacy is important. In IP networks, based
on the source and destination IP addresses, an adversary can
track interactions and interaction patterns, revealing personal
data about the users. Therefore, practical mechanisms have
been developed to enhance user privacy via unlinkability and
unobservability, in the so-called anonymity networks, or mix
nets. One of the most popular anonymity networks today is
The Onion Routing (Tor), built as an overlay network among
volunteer systems on the Internet. Tor provides anonymous
communication between source and destination as well as data
integrity. Onion routing is a low-latency application of mix
nets, where each message is encrypted to each proxy using
public key cryptography, with the resulting layered encryption.
Each relay has a public and a private key. The public keys are
known by all users and are used to establish communication
path. Anonymous communication is possible through traffic
tunneling over a chain of randomly selected Tor relays. After
the tunnel between a pair of Tor routers is setup, symmetric
key cryptography is used to transfer the data. These encryption
layers ensure sender unlinkability, whereby the eavesdropper
is unable to guess complete path from observed links [1], [2].
As more and more data is transmitted in the configurable
photonic layer, whereby all optical switches and routers for-
ward packets without electronic layers involved, we envision
privacy as the intrinsic property of optical networks also. Just
like optical and quantum cryptography has advanced the field
of traditional cryptography [3], [4], optical network systems
designed with secrecy and anonymity features should also
be able to provide essential building blocks for privacy in
future networks, built to serve free societies. However, in
contrast to Tor networks, where privacy and anonymity directly
depend on number and dependability of volunteer systems,
the privacy features in optical network need to be approached
differently: for instance, it is a telecom operator that should
be able offer a private optical communication service as a
value added feature. For instance, for some client networks
an optical network can grant anonymous access to third-party
servers in the cloud, whereby the traffic contents and the origin
of requests can remain secret for both the attacker as well as
the cloud provider. In designing an anonymous optical network
akin to Tor, however, several obstacles need to be overcome,
since the main features need to be primarily implemented in
photonics, i.e., without intervention of electronics, such as
encryption, traffic routing, and session key distribution. Also,
just as Tor requires compute intensive processing of encryption
layers in forwarding routers, high speed processing of optical
data would also be required, or consideration of large optical
buffers, which is a challenge, and requires practical founda-
tions for privacy-enhancing optical network technologies.
In this paper, we propose to treat the well-known privacy
constructs of Tor in the optical layers, which we refer to as the
Optical Onion Routing (OOR). To this end, we address two
practical issues: the design of all-optical anonymization nodes,
and the secrecy and privacy degree achieved. To design an
optical anonymizaiton node, we propose to generate a session
key with Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), – a com-
ponent more commonly used for random number generation,
able to utilize different primitive irreducible polynomials of
random degree. In addition, we propose to use an optical XOR
operation as encryption, an important all-optical technology
coming of age. These two components allow to encrypt data
in the optical layer at the line speed, thus eliminating the need
for large buffers in the node. To enable optical routing and
forwarding, we integrate the anonymization functions in the
traditional optical cross connect architecture, with the goal of
processing optical data all-optically as much as possible with
the current technologies. Finally, we prove formally that for
the encryption technique and distribution of secret information
proposed, the system can be perfectly private and secrecy-
preserving, whereby entropy of the secret data is equal to or
less than equivocation observed by the fiber eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides principles of the optical anonymity routing proposed.
Section III presents the analysis. Section IV shows analytical
and simulation results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Anonymous forwarding
Onion routing in the Internet is based on a connection-
oriented communication channel, a circuit. This is where we
start drawing the analogy. We envision optical WDM network
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Fig. 1: Anonymous forwarding through data transformation.
as the underlaying infrastructure to setup that circuit, and as-
sume a network of optical nodes and fiber links, where switch-
ing, routing and forwarding is all done in the photonic domain.
Just like in the Tor, the nodes can act as either regular optical
nodes, - with all-optical switching and forwarding functions, or
the anonymization nodes. Anonymization nodes are the optical
nodes with enhanced functions responsible for processing and
forwarding optical signals, such that no correlation can be
established between the source and destination by tapping into
any link along the way. As the optical network architecture
usually encompass both the data plane, and from the data
plane a separated control plane, we assume that the control
plane is able to provide information about network topology,
available network resources and is able to direct optical data
and control the related processing such as encryption. Similar
to Tor, only a subset of anonymization nodes in the network
is enough to assure secrecy and anonymity. Control plane
randomly selects anonymization nodes in the network and
available wavelengths and, then, sends control message to
establish optical circuit between source s and destination d on
the select wavelengths. Here, control plane does not distribute
the actual session keys, but only the routing information for
optical circuit setup as well as randomly selected parameters
for session key generation. To keep these sensitive control
information private and confidential, the control plane encrypts
it in layers by applying the public key cryptography, just like
in Tor. Fig. 1 illustrates the idea of OOR network architecture.
The source s is an initiator of private communication,
whereby, based on control plane information, anonymization
nodes and the corresponding available wavelengths are ran-
domly selected, and made known to the source. After that,
the control plane sends, on a select wavelength or separate
control channel, the control messages to establish optical
circuit between source s and destination d, as well as to
distribute policies of session key generation to all nodes
in that circuit. This is similar to Tor network, where the
tunnel is established over randomly selected IP routers. In
our example, the path between source and destination consists
of two concatenated circuits, one between nodes s and a
and the other one between the nodes a and d, whereby each
circuit contains one forwarding node; the forwarding node is a
traditional optical switching and forwarding function, without
anonymization. The circuit, i.e., end-to-end wavelength path, is
established over arbitrary available links and forwarding nodes
on the available wavelengths. Thus, the path available between
s and d is randomly selected for setup, so that neither the
destination d nor anonymization nodes know the paths selected
(which is the essence of Tor). The control message is encrypted
with public keys of nodes a and d, as in Tor. In contrast to Tor,
where data from exit node, i.e., the last anonymization node,
to destination is sent without encryption, all nodes involved in
anonymous communication in OOR, i.e, s, a and d, perform
anonymization of optical data via encryption.
The idea behind onion routing, and its Tor implementation,
is to hide the communicating nodes from the eavesdropper of
the individual links, as well as the identity of the source from
the destination. This is how we envision to do it in the optical
layer. After the optical path (tunnel) is established (via two
circuits) the secret data m is ready for transmission towards
the anonymization node a. The secret data m is encrypted at
the source with a session keys ca and cd of a and d, respec-
tively. These session keys are generated with the previously
mentioned Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), which is
its new application as it is a component more commonly used
for random number generation. Here, LSFR generates the key
based on randomly selected generator polynomials and seeds
configured by the control plane. Thus, the source sends an
optical stream [m + cd + ca] to node a. Lambda reader in
node a detects the input port and wavelength allocated, and
based on that allocated wavelength the Key Generation Unit
allocates a suitable session key ca which is then sent to optical
Decryption Unit. Finally, the payload is decrypted with a key
ca as m + cd + ca + ca = m + cd. Next, the optical data
stream [m + cd] sent by a over sub-tunnel reaches node d.
After detecting of input signal on certain wavelength, at d, the
session key cd is applied to optical payload as m+cd+cd = m.
Due to data encryption in anonymization nodes, each outgoing
optical stream differs from incoming optical stream. When
an attacker has access to links of certain switch, it must
deanonymize all outgoing data to identify a certain optical
stream of interest and to guess its next hop.
B. Discussion on implementation
1) Public Key Cryptography: To distribute confidential
control plane information during optical circuit (tunnel) setup
process, the public key cryptography can be applied, similar
to Tor. The public key cryptosystems require two keys, i.e.,
Fig. 2: Architecture of optical node in OOR network.
public K+ and private K−. The public keys of all nodes in the
network are known. Due to the fact, that the key information
must be stored, the public key cryptosystem is implemented in
the electronic control plane layer, similar to what is proposed
in [5]. In our architecture, we do not define a specific public
key cryptosystem and generally allow all existing public key
designs, which can be based on discrete logarithm problem
such as Diffie-Hellman, factorization problem such as Rivest-
Shamir-Adelmann (RSA) or on square root problem, such as
Rabin systems.
2) Exclusive or (XOR) operation: The XOR operation
utilized in cryptographic systems is usually implemented in
software. We propose to implement encryption and decryption
with session keys in the optical layer, i.e., data anonymization,
with an all-optical XOR gate component [6], [7]. The XOR
operation transforms the incoming data into new outgoing
data and, thus, unlinks the communication between source
and destination, whereby each incoming message is mixed,
i.e., XOR concatenated, with a session key. Here, ultrafast
nonlinear interferometers based on semiconductor optical am-
plifiers (SOAs) can be used to combine two optical streams,
whereby transverse electric (TE) and transverse magnetic (TM)
components of a probe pulse can be split and recombine by
setting the relative optical delays between them. When the
phases experienced by the TE and TM components in the SOA
are the same, the resulting signal is ’1’, or ’0’ otherwise.
3) Linear Feedback Shift Register: In each anonymization
node, optical data is ananymized by encryption, before it is
forwarded to output port. We propose to generate the session
key for ananymization by LFSR, a component commonly used
as random number generator. The session key generation with
LFSR is discussed in [8], [9]. Since LFSR of length n bits
can generally be easily deducted by observing 2n consecu-
tive generated bits, we propose to utilize different generator
polynomials of different degrees and randomly selected seeds.
This can help us to increase the amount and randomness of
possible session keys, with the goal to provide a one-time pad,
which is random, and at least as long as the plaintext, and
not reused and completely secret [10]. Generally, LFSR can
be implemented in hardware or software. In our system, this
function is implemented in the optical layer, which necessitates
an electrical-to-optical conversion before encryption (XOR).
The session key can be pre-calculated during circuit setup
process, or generated at line rate. The first variant is suitable for
LFSR implementations as we propose, based on [11], whereby
it must be assumed that additional electronic buffer is required
to store the pre-calculated keys. In contrast, the second solution
must be implemented at line speed, what is a challenge for
current optical systems, due to high speed, though it would
eliminate the need for buffer.
C. OOR node architecture
A possible node architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2. As it
can be seen, the typical WDM node architecture is enhanced
to provide functions of anonymization. In that sense, the
node can act as a simple forwarding (all-optical switching
node), anonymization node, or OOR node for sending (source)
or termination (destination). We next describe each of these
functionalities and concepts in more detail.
1) Source : The basic function of the source node is to
modulate the electronic signals onto optical carriers, along
with the flow encryption, the wavelength assignment and/or
any other flow adaptation for further transmission over an
OTN/WDM network. Here, the optical data generated (m′) is
encrypted with the dedicated keys from LFSR and by applying
optical XOR. The source collects all anonymization keys of the
anonymization nodes that are to be used on the wavelength
path assigned, e.g., #»c = {c1, c2, ..., cd} and these keys are to
be utilized by each anonymization node traversed, e.g., c1 by
the node a1 and cd by destination d; this is a way to anonymize
the incoming optical data for the next hop or to decrypt it. The
generation of the key ci is important and it is created in LFSR
with polynomial c∗i from vector
#»c ∗ and seed Shi from
#  »
Sh,
both randomly selected in the control plane and distributed to
each node ai during the circuit setup. The incoming optical
signal m′ is then encrypted with optical XOR by all elements
from #»c as [m′ + c1...d], where c1...d = c1 + c2 + ... + cd.
The encrypted optical data [m′ + c1...d] is finally sent to the
predefined optical circuit (on Fiber 4).
2) Anonymization: Each anonymization node performs
data anonymization/decryption before forwarding. Here, the
incoming optical flows mi = [m′ + ci...d] from optical circuit
on wavelength λ1 (Fiber 1) is detected, and the information
about this wavelength is sent to Lambda Reader and Key
Generation Unit for matching. As a result, the corresponding
anonymization key ci is forwarded to optical XOR gate. The
session key was also here generated by LFSR by utilizing
generator polynomial c∗i and corresponding seed Shi, just like
in the source node. The session key is simply converted to
optical signal, before it is XOR-concatenated with data, as
follows [m′ + ci...d + ci] = [m′ + ci+1...d]. For simplicity,
if the data is to be further sent towards the next hop, we
assume that the same wavelength is utilized, respecting the
wavelength continuity constraint. Otherwise, the signal can
also be retransmitted (converted) to another wavelength, which
would make it more complex.
3) Destination: When data reached its destination d, it is
processed just like if destination were an ananymization node.
The received optical payload [m′+cd] is decrypted with key cd
into [m′], converted into the electronic signal at the destination.
III. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
A. Routing and Treat Model in OOR
1) Routing model: We assume that optical circuits in form
of wavelength-continuous optical paths are setup in the random
fashion over a randomly selected wavelength, whereby a
network provides at most N optical paths between source
s and destination d over all wavelengths and fibers, which
for the sake of modeling we collect in set Ψ. Generally,
only N out of N , N ≥ N , paths are available, while at
least one wavelength paths among them is randomly selected
for transmission. All N existing optical paths are arranged
in the sorted vector
#»
P = (P0 P1 ... PN−2 PN−1 ) with
related probabilities, that an individual path Pl is available.
We denote a fiber link as ev′v′′ and a wavelength link on
λx connecting two nodes, v′ and v′′, as a wavelength link
as ev′v′′(λx) ∈ ev′v′′ , respectively. The capacity of a fiber
link is measured in number of wavelengths. Thus, each edge
ev′v′′ provides cev′v′′ parallel wavelength links between nodes
v′ and v′′. Each path Pl between s and d consists of θl + 1
links elk ∈ Pl, 1 ≤ k ≤ θl + 1, and of θl intermediate nodes
vlq ∈ Pl, 1 ≤ q ≤ θl, while η out of θl nodes are randomly
selected as anonymization nodes ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ η.
Let us now assume that there is a collection A, which
contains a = C(|Φ|, γ) := (|Φ|γ ) path sets Aα, 1 ≤ α ≤ a,
while Φ can be a collection of all N existing paths, i.e., Ψ,
or of N available paths, i.e., |Φ| = N or |Φ| = N , and γ can
be a number of available paths N or the number of required
for transmission paths, i.e., γ := N or γ := 1. In contrast,
set Bα = Φ\Aα = {Pl|Pl /∈ Aα} from collection B is the
αth set of remaining |Φ| − γ elements, which are not in the
αth combination Aα. Thus, the probability P ′′(α, γ,Φ), that
γ paths are in set Aα and not in set Bα, is defined as
P ′′(α, γ,Φ) =
γ∏
i=1,
Pli∈Aα
Pli(α)
|Φ|−γ∏
t=1,
Plt∈Bα
(1− Plt(α)) (1)
, where Pli(α) and Plt(α) are probabilities of path Pl, l =
1, 2, ...,N , collected in Aα and Bα and indexes i and t are
the sequence numbers of paths in Aα and Bα, respectively.
As a result, the network provides Ω = j wavelength paths
out of N paths with probability Pˆ (Ω = j,Ψ) defined as
Pˆ (Ω = j,Ψ) =
(Nj )∑
α=1
P ′′(α, j,Ψ) (2)
, where the αth set from the collection A contains one path
combination out of
(N
j
)
combinations of Ω = j, 0 ≤ j ≤ N ,
available paths with related probabilities from vector
#»
P .
In case of N < 1 (no path is available), the transmission
request will be blocked with probability PB , i.e.,
PB = Pˆ (Ω = 0,Ψ) (3)
Since we assume that all N paths have the same probability
1/N to be selected for transmission, the probability, that any
path Pl collected in Aα is available and utilized, is
P (α) = P
′′(α,1,Ψ)(1−PB)
Pˆ (Ω=1,Ψ)
(4)
2) Threat model: The treat model assumes that an attacker
can eavesdrop select links in the network, and guess the source
and destination nodes, as well as the data transmitted. To
model this, let us define a set W, containing all possible
wiretap edges, while at most w = |W| edges can be attacked
simultaneously. Since optical receivers are broadband, we
assume that an attacker is always able to access all cev′v′′
wavelengths on a fiber link ev′v′′ .
Let us assume the worst type of attack in the network,
where any link in the network can be eavesdropped with a
probability φ. In other words, the set of fiber links attacked
W and its size w are variable, while each link can belong to
set W with probability φ. Here, each wavelength path can be
wiretapped with probability Pw(Pl) defined by Eq. (5) as a
probability that at least one wiretap link utilized by path Pl.
Pw(Pl) = φ
θl∑
i=0
(1− φ)i = 1− (1− φ)θl+1 (5)
, where φ has the same value for all links in the network.
As a result, the probability, that a wiretap path is utilized for
transmission, is defined by using of Eqs. (4) and (5) as
Pφw =
N∑
α=1
Pw(Pl)P (α),∀Pl ∈ Aα (6)
B. Analysis of data anonymization
The secret data m′ of length Lm′ bits is sent over OOR
network passing through η, 0 ≤ η ≤ ηmax anonymization
nodes, whereby ηmax is the maximal number of anonymization
nodes can be utilized along optical tunnel. When an attacker
gains access to encrypted optical data m with probability Pφw
as discussed previously, it has to decrypt m along all its
anonymization keys to reveal the secret data m′.
Lemma 1. The OOR system is perfectly secure, whereby an
attacker is not able to recover the secret data m′ sent over
randomly selected wavelength path.
Proof: A secret data m′ of length Lm′ bits is generally
an arbitrary bit sequence out of all 2Lm′ possible, while the
entropy of the plain text is H(m′) = Lm′ . m′ is encrypted
by all η + 1 secret keys of all anonymization node and of
the destination. Thus, there are (η + 1)! · (2Lm′−2η+1 ) · 2Lm′
possible combinations of m′ and η+1 secret keys, while each
combination always contains η + 2 different elements out of
2Lm′ , whereby only m′ can contain zero element. Thus, the
entropy of encrypted data m′ is defined as follow
He(m
′) = log
(
(η + 1)!
(
2Lm′−2
η+1
) · 2Lm′) !≥ Lm′ =: H(m′)
(7)
An attacker does not have any knowledge about the number
of selected anonymization nodes η or the number of already
passed anonymization nodes on the wavelength path and, thus,
has to check all ηmax+1 possible variants of the same, where
m′ can be encrypted by one to ηmax + 1 secret keys. Thus,
the equivocation H(m′|m) observed by an attacker is
H(m′|m) =
ηmax∑
i=0
log
(
(ηmax + 1− i)! ·
(
2Lm′−2
ηmax+1−i
) · 2Lm′)
(8)
However, H(m′|m) ≥ H(m′), thus any m′ can be transmitted
perfectly secret.
To provide data privacy and anonymity, the proposed OOR
utilizes different functional components such as public key
cryptography, encoding by XOR and key generation with
LFSR on control and data plane. Next, we analyze information-
theoretically the resulting privacy and anonymity degree as a
function of components utilized.
1) Public Key Cryptography: The public key cryptosys-
tems require two keys, i.e., public K+ and private K−. The
message m sent to node vj is encrypted by public key K+j
of vj as me = K+j (m). The destination vj can decrypt
received message me by applying the private key K−j as
K−j (me) = K
−
j (K
+
j (m)) = m. For high level of data secrecy,
we restrict the policies for selecting of key and plain text sizes
as H(m) ≤ H(K+), where H(m) = Lm and H(K+) = LK
are entropies of secret message of length Lm bits and public
key of length LK bits, respectively, i.e., Lm ≤ LK . That
ensures that an eavesdropper is not able to break the utilized
cryptosystem by obtaining the encrypted data me.
2) XOR operation: We assume that incoming date mvi
of length Lmvi in node vi is mixed, i.e., XOR concatenated,
with a secret key ci of length Lci so that an attacker can not
recognize mvi and its next hop node vj . The outgoing data
mvj is defined as mvj = mvi + ci = {∀mvip ∈ mvi ∧ ∀cip ∈
ci|(¬mvip ∧cip)∨ (mvip ∧¬cip)}, where mvip and cip are the
pth bits, 1 ≤ p ≤ Lmvi , and, 1 ≤ p ≤ Lci , within mvi and ci,
respectively. Without loss of generality, any secret data m′ is
XOR encrypted into data m of the same length Lm = Lm′ .
3) LFSR: Generally, keys generated with LFSR do not
provide a strong cryptographic security, whereby an attacker
is able to gain the generator polynomial of degree g, if it
receives at least 2g consecutive plain text bits generated by
LFSR. To this end, we propose to generate session key ci
for data anonymization directly in each anonymization node
ai, whereby a primitive irreducible polynomial c∗i of degree
g and seed Shi as a start point are randomly selected by
source for each utilized anonymization node ai and secretly
distributed with public key cryptography. The source randomly
selects one out of Cg = ϕ(2g − 1)/g primitive polynomials
of arbitrary degree g, gmin ≤ g ≤ gmax, where ϕ(x) =
x(1 − 1/p1)(1 − 1/p2)...(1 − 1/pk) is Euler function, while
p1...pk are the prim numbers. The minimal degree gmin is
defined so that the maximal key length generated by LFSR is
larger than data m′ encrypted by this key, i.e., Lm′ < 2gmin−1.
Due to public key cryptography used to distribute control
messages during setup process of the optical circuit, all the data
is assumed to be perfectly secret. In other words, each control
message mc of length Lc encrypted with a public key K+i of
node vi can not be recovered by an attacker, unless the control
message mc out of all 2Lc possible messages is guessed, i.e.,
H(mc) = Lc = H(mc|K+i (mc)) ≤ H(K−i |K+i (mc)) =
H(K−i ). As a result, the routing information for circuit
provisioining, the bit sequences #»c ∗, i.e., randomly selected
primitive polynomials for session key generation, and random
selected seeds
#»
Sh are perfectly secret, which can not be
recovered by an external attacker.
Since the data from source to destination is anonymized
in each anonymization node along optical tunnel, an attacker
can only discover s and d by accessing all η + 1 wavelength
segments between the anonymization nodes, as well as all
incoming links of s and outgoing links of d to ensure that
they are not the forwarding nodes of optical data attacked.
Lemma 2. The proposed OOR ensures privacy and secrecy
between any s− d pair from an arbitrary extern attacker, if
gmax∑
g=gmin
log
(
ϕ(2g−1)(2g−1)
g
)
≥ Lm ≤ 2gmin − 1 (9)
Proof: Let us assume that attacker has access to all links
along the path. In this case, the attacker needs to deanonymize
the optical data sent by each node ai to the next anonymization
node ai+1. Due to the fact that the polynomial c∗i of length g+1
bits, gmin ≤ g ≤ gmax, and seed Shi are chosen randomly
and transmitted perfectly secure, the entropy of anonymization
key can be defined as H1(ci) =
∑gmax
g=gmin
log(Cg(2
g − 1)),
while source randomly selects one out of Cg existing primitive
irreducible polynomials of degree g and a seed out of 2g − 1
(without zero) possible for each anonymization node. On the
other hand, the secret key ci can be an arbitrary bit sequence
out of 2Lm possible, i.e., H2(ci) = Lm bits. An attacker can
follow the algorithm for generation of ci and, thus, guesses
any c∗i and Shi or directly guesses ci of length Lm. In the
first case, the equivocation is defined as H(ci|K+i (mc)) =
H(ci|m) =
∑gmax
g=gmin
log(Cg(2
g−1)) = H1(ci), while, in the
second case, H(ci|K+i (mc)) = H(ci|m) = Lm = H2(ci).
For an attacker, it is simpler to guess polynomial and seed,
if
∑gmax
g=gmin
Cg(2
g − 1) < 2Lm . Thus, H1(ci) must be equal
to or larger than H2(ci) for a perfect secrecy. Since there are
Cg = ϕ(2
g − 1)/g primitive polynomials of degree g, the
condition for perfect secrecy provided by anonymization key
can be defined by Eq. (9), i.e., an attacker will be not able to
deanonymize and to link (trace back) to nodes s and d.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now show theoretical results for proposed private and
anonymous OOR network and validate the same by simula-
tions. The analytical results were calculated with Eq. (6) as
well as with Eqs. (7) and (8). Since our model directly depends
a steady state wavelength path availability and random path
selection, we validate the analysis by using dynamic Monte-
Carlo-simulations with 95% of confidence.
We analyze modified optical network topology with
24 nodes and 35 fiber links, each fiber link carrying 10
wavelengths λ; each wavelength has the capacity of 10Gb/s.
The link directions and available number of wavelengths on
each fiber link are defined as {1 − 2, 1 − 3, 2 − 6, 2 − 3, 3 −
4, 3−7, 4−5, 4−10, 10−11, 11−5, 6−16, 6−7, 16−17, 7−
17, 7 − 8, 17 − 18, 18 − 8, 18 − 22, 8 − 9, 9 − 4, 9 − 12, 9 −
19, 22− 19, 22− 23, 19− 20, 23− 24, 23− 20, 20− 12, 20−
21, 24− 21, 12− 10, 12− 13, 21− 15, 15− 13, 13− 11} and
{6, 6, 3, 3, 4, 5, 4, 3, 4, 8, 2, 1, 2, 3, 3, 5, 2, 3, 5, 3, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1,
2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 4}, respectively. Let us consider source
node 1 and destination node 5. Here, there are in
total N = 12 different possible wavelength paths over
all available wavelength links. All paths are sorted
in the ascending order of length in number of hops,
and collected in
#»
P . The path availability for each
λ decreases with increasing path length, i.e.,
#»
P =
{0.9, 0.85, 0.8, 0.75, 0.75, 0.7, 0.65, 0.6, 0.55, 0.55, 0.5, 0.5}.
Before transmission, random wavelength paths between
Fig. 3: Normalized equivocation vs. amount of anonymization nodes.
Fig. 4: H(m′|m) and Pφw vs. probability for attacked link, φ.
anonymization nodes are established by utilizing available
wavelengths. Every node in the network can be used as an
anonymization node, and the number of anonymization nodes
per path is determined randomly.
Fig. 3 shows the normalized equivocation H(m′|m) as a
function of amount of number anonymization nodes η used on
a path and of maximal number of anonymization nodes ηmax.
An increase in ηmax increases the system robustness against
wiretapping (dashed line), while an attacker have to recover
more redundant information, when η < ηmax anonymization
nodes are utilized. For instance, an attacker must recover
35He(m
′) bits to guess secret data m′ in case of η = 0 and
ηmax = 9, while increase in η increases entropy He(m′) as
per Eq. (7) and decreases redundant information in encrypted
data m up to 6He(m′) for η = ηmax = 9.
Next, we assume ηmax = 2 and evaluate the equivocation
H(m′|m) and the probabilities Pw and Pφw for successful
eavesdropping and correctly recovered data m′. Fig. 4 shows
the normalized mean equivocation H(m′|m) and probabil-
ity for wiretapped transmission path Pφw , when any link in
the network can be eavesdropped with probability φ. The
equivocation redundancy and probability for eavesdropped
transmission path Pφw increase with φ. As a result, an attacker
can wiretap almost all paths when probability for wiretap
link, φ, is 50%, while equivocation redundancy amounts
9H(m′), when an attacker tries to decrypt. Next, we consider
a special case whereby a maximum of 4 fiber links in net-
work can be wiretapped either simultaneously or indiviudally,
ei ∈ {3 − 7, 8 − 9, 17 − 18, 13 − 11}. Fig. 5 shows the
normalized mean equivocation H(m′|m) and probability for
wiretapped transmission path Pw as a function of number of
fiber links wiretapped at the same time, i.e., w. An increase
in w increases the probability Pw and, thus, the amount of
redundant information required to be recovered by attacker,
which follows the algorithm to guess m′ from eavesdropped
Fig. 5: H(m′|m) and Pw vs. number of wiretap fiber links, i.e., w.
optical data m. Here, the equivocation increases from around
2.7H(m′) to 4H(m′) bits with increasing number of wiretap
links, i.e., for w = 1 and w = 4, respectively, while the mean
amount of wiretapped data, i.e., Pw, also increases.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed an Optical Onion Routing (OOR) archi-
tecture, the mirror of Tor. We designed the network and a
new optical anonymization node architecture, including the
optical components (XOR) and their electronic counterparts
(LFSR) to realize layered encryption. We proved formally and
confirmed numerically that such an optical onion network can
be perfectly private and secure. The paper aimed at providing
practical foundations for privacy-enhancing optical network
technologies, and as such is work in progress.
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